This study examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and risk of stock price crash in UK firms. We use CEO Pay Slice (CPS) -the fraction of maximum top-five executives' total compensation that goes to the CEO, and board 'busyness' -the proportion of board level directors who have three or more directorships , to evaluate the effect of these two important aspects of corporate governance on stock price crash risk. The CPS reflects relative importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extract rents and expropriate shareholders wealth (expropriation effect). Board busyness may create a serious agency problem because directors are "too busy to mind the business", allowing for executives' short-termism and bad news hoarding (busyness effect). Using a large sample of UK listed companies over the 1997 to 2010 period, we document evidence supporting a positive relationship between CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk. In line with the expropriation and busyness effects, we find that companies with high CPS and high levels of board busyness are exposed to higher level of stock price crash risk. The fact that CPS positively impacts on stock price crash risk has a strong implication for the ongoing debate on how to reform executive remuneration so that it provides the right incentives to directors. There is also a direct implication for the public debate on limitation of the number of directorships held by executives from our findings, as we argue that board effectiveness depends on the overall level of board business.
Introduction
The finance literature has long examined corporate governance characteristics. Within the rapidly developing research on corporate governance, a significant proportion of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature has concentrated on studying the relationship between governance characteristics and stock price crash risk that is of key importance to many managers, investors, and academics. Changes in regulations, asset expropriation, disruptive product innovations, market crashes can all provoke stock price crashes. Increases in stock price crash risk can result in the decline of expected cash flows and NPVs. When cash flows fall below investors' expectations, managers tend to hide the bad news in order to protect their own wealth, human capital, and jobs (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Holmstrom, 1999; Benmelegh et al., 2010; Gormley and Matsa, 2011) . Once negative firm-specific information becomes generally realized, stock price drops dramatically (Jin and Myers, 2006) , increasing stock price crash risk. A considerable body of literature suggests that corporate governance mechanisms can help to prevent suboptimal managerial behaviors and so significantly reduce the risk of the firm's stock price crashing. Still, evidence on the impact of corporate governance characteristics on stock price crash risk outside the US is limited.
In this study, we attempt to throw additional light on the links between corporate governance characteristics and stock price crashes in the UK. In particular, we investigate whether pay inequality between a company's CEO and the other top executives, as well as board 'busyness' affect stock price crash risk of British companies. We define pay inequality as the proportion of top executives' total compensation that goes to the CEO -which has been labeled the CEO Pay Slice (CPS); and we measure corporate board busyness by the proportion of busy directors (directors with three or more directorships) represented at the board level. Our main hypothesis is that companies with high CPS and 'busy' boards (which are both characteristics of weak corporate governance) are more exposed to stock price crash risk, all else equal. Explanations of positive relationship between CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk conform to one of the following theoretical frames. First, high CPS may be an indication of CEO centrality. Powerful CEO can influence decision making process within the board room according to his/her own managerial style and risk preferences. CEO managerial style (whether conservative or aggressive) has been shown to influence important corporate decisions (Malmendier et al., 2011) . CPS, as a measure of CEO power connected directly to stock price crash risk emerging from the implementation of certain corporate policies. Second, high-powered compensation packages, combined with information asymmetry, in the situations where boards are busy, magnify agency problems, and can also incentivize CEO and top executives to take on decisions that may enhance short term performance and so increase exposure to the stock price crash risk. Third, due to information asymmetry, it is difficult for outsiders to differentiate between managerial actions that generate true positive returns from those that generate high returns in order to help managers to camouflage the real situation in their companies and protect their jobs, at least for some time. Therefore, carefully considered structures of CEO and top executives' compensation packages, coupled with low pay disparity between top executive team members and good quality monitoring from non-busy corporate board may be necessary to control stock price crash risk exposures.
The recent corporate scandals around "fat cats" compensation packages in Britain 1 are a timely reminder that this problem requires further attention. Executive pay has become a major issue in recent years in the UK, with shareholders questioning high salaries directors receive 2,3 . The British government has been very proactive in tackling compensation-related problems. Thus, in 2002, the UK became the first country to mandate an annual non-binding shareholder vote on directors' remuneration ("say on pay") to improve the "accountability, transparency, and performance linkage of executive pay" (Baird and Stowasser, 2003) . In September 2013, the government went one step further and introduced mandatory 'say on pay'. Shortcomings in regulation of compensation-related issues have been also addressed by the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 (The Code), with particular attention being paid to the importance of establishing a strong link between directors' remuneration and firm performance 4 , as well as responsibilities of directors for risk oversight and management 5 . In our analysis we use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, comprising 692 firms over the 1997 to 2010 period. We control for important corporate governance characteristics, such as board composition, board size, CEO-Chairman duality, and CEO tenure; we also control for various firm-specific characteristics, which are company size, ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, and leverage. Our empirical methodology includes the use of panel data and a system GMM estimator. By using this estimator, we avoid problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of regressors. The system GMM estimator is also considered as more efficient 2 See The Wall Street Journal -Business: "U.K. Unveils Plan on Executive Pay", 20 June, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304765304577478172485959522 3 "There is compelling evidence of a disconnect between pay and performance in large UK listed companies", UK Business Secretary Vince Cable told Parliament; David Cameron, the UK Prime Minister, also criticised boardroom cronies who helped each other "fill their boots" while the country was forced to tighten its belt. "We've got to deal with the merry-go-round where there are too many cases of remuneration committee members sitting on each other's boards, patting each other's backs and handing out each other's pay rises," he said. "We need to redefine the word 'fair'. We need to try to give people a sense that we have a vision at the end of this, of a fairer, better economy, a fairer, better society, where if you work hard and do the right thing you get rewarded" , 7 January, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/07/david-cameron-fat-cat-pay 4 Section D: Remuneration. Main Principle: "Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain, and motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors' remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance." (The UK Corporate Governance Code, June 2010: p.22).
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Section C2: Risk Management and Internal Control. Main Principle: "The board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board should maintain sound risk management and internal control systems." than other instrumental variable techniques in controlling for the possible endogeneity of explanatory variables (see Almeida et al., 2010) .
Throughout our analysis, we find consistent support for the proposition that higher CPS and board busyness are associated with higher stock price crash risk. Our results strongly support the expropriation and busyness arguments 6 . Thus, a high CPS level could be due to an agency problem in firms with powerful and influential CEO, who is able to stockpile negative information from the market for financial (expropriation of rents through the compensation arrangements) 7 or non-financial reasons (e.g., empire building with a view to expropriating future rents) 8 . However, upon the realization of this (negative) information by the market, company's stock price crashes (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009 (An and Zhang, 2013) , the opacity of financial reports (Hutton et al., 2009) , and CEO incentives and power (Kim et al., 2011a) . We contribute to this literature by considering other aspects of governance arrangement, the CPS and board busyness, and their impact on stock price crash risk. Finally, our work enhances the literature that analyzes different CEO qualities and characteristics and their effect on firm outcomes.
We highlight CPS and board busyness as important features which can provide additional insight into understanding the link between corporate governance characteristics and stock price crash risk. This is the first study that we are aware of, highlighting the above mentioned aspects using the UK-based sample. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Healy et al., 1999) .
Good corporate governance practices discipline investments (Masulis et al., 2007) , prevent earnings management (Xie et al., 2003) , improve information disclosure process (Armstrong et al., 2012; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) , and align interests of managers and shareholders (Benmelegh et al., 2010 among others) . Ironically, the structure of executives' compensation -which is supposed to align interests of managers and shareholders -may also trigger agency problems. Accordingly, Healy (1985) , Beneish (1999) , Ke (2005) , Burns and Kedia (2006) , Johnson et al. (2009) , Kedia and Philippon (2010) argue that stock-based compensation leads to accounting fraud, misreporting, and earnings mismanagement, followed by the stock price overvaluation and collapse. compensation packages need to account for the particular managerial style (conservative or aggressive) arising from managers' past experience to make financial incentives effective. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) investigate the importance of risk control for bank holding companies (BHC). They hypothesize that company's risk culture 13 determines both the risk appetite and the strength of the risk management system. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) differentiate between risk cultures that follow "business model channel" or "hedging 11 Gormley et al. (2013) recommend that, in designing executives' compensation packages, boards should consider the potential changes in companies' risk environment and how executives will respond given their compensation levels.
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Gormley and Matsa (2011) advise that executives' exposure to firm risk can be reduced if the stock-based component in their compensation packages is reduced. 13 Kimbrough and Componation (2009) argue that company's organisational culture plays an important role in areas such as implementation of new initiatives, its reaction to changes in the market and its ability to navigate major changes in its business environment.
channel"
14 . Conservative (aggressive) companies with "business model channel" culture take lower (higher) risk and have stronger (weaker) risk management in place; in contrast, under the "hedging channel" culture, aggressive (conservative) companies undertake high (low) risk coupled with a strong (weak) risk management. By evaluating companies' response to unexpected losses during the 1998 Russian crisis, they find evidence supporting the business model channel culture, i.e., companies with high tail risk had a weaker risk management system in place. This result is consistent with findings in Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) , who find that financial institutions which performed worst during the 1998 crisis also demonstrated the worst performance during the 2007-2008 crisis.
CPS and Stock price crash risk.
Weak corporate governance can result in CEO-dominated firms (Jiraporn et al., 2005) . The importance of a "dominant player" in corporate decision making cannot be underestimated (Bebchuk et al., 2011) . However, there is a risk that influential CEO can hide problems from the board (Jiraporn et al., 2005; Walkling, 2010) . If board does not have all necessary information, board becomes less effective and problems are likely to remain hidden until "revealed by a disaster" (Walkling, 2010: p.17) . There is also an exposure to expropriation risk, which results from rent extractions by dominant CEOs (Walkling, 2010) . Rent extraction by company insiders, including CEOs affects corporate investment, cost of funds, company growth, and stock returns (see Becht et al., 2003) .
To identify CEO dominancy, Bebchuk et al. (2011) use 'CEO pay slice (CPS)' -the proportion of the aggregate salary of top five executive directors that goes to the CEO. High CPS level signals agency problems in companies with dominant CEO and weak corporate governance. A powerful and authoritative CEO is able to influence the structure of his/her 14 The latter so called because it is consistent with the main predictions of hedging theories in Smith and Stulz (1985) ;and in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013) .
own compensation contract in a way that allows him/her to expropriate rents at the expense of shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Jiraporn et al., 2005) . Studies by Blanchard et al.
(1994), Yermack (1997) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) determine that some features of compensation packages reflect rent-seeking by executives. Jiraporn et al. (2005) - investigate the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate governance 15 , and also find evidence supporting the rent expropriation argument.
We follow Bebchuk et al. (2011) and interpret a high CPS as a sign of a CEO centrality. A dominant CEO could influence decision making processes within a board room according to his/her own managerial style and risk preferences. CEO managerial style (conservative or aggressive) influences important corporate decisions (Malmendier et al. 2011 ) and firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) . Hence, CPS might be connected directly to the stock price crash risk, which emerges as a result of implementation of certain corporate policies. High CPS magnifies agency problems, and might incentivize a CEO to take on decisions (e.g., financing, investment and dividend decision) that enable him/her to extract rents and so expropriate shareholders' wealth. Thus, for example, a dominant CEO could prioritize short-term price maximization to secure his/her own private benefits, and hide true information from the board of directors, so increasing company's exposure to stock price crash risk. These arguments lead us to the following (expropriation) hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: CPS is positively associated with stock price crash risk.
Busy Boards and Stock price crash risk
The agency theory literature suggests that directors who overstretch themselves and accept additional seats on more boards due to the associated extra personal perquisites, tend to spend less time on each individual board, so compromising their responsibilities and 15 Jiraporn et al. (2005) use shareholder rights as a measure of the corporate governance standard.
neglecting their duties (Ferris et al., 2003) 16 . Holding multiple directorships might negatively affect monitoring and advisory capacity of the board. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and Core et al. (1999) argue that directors with multiple seats "cater for CEOs", and that multiple board appointments correlate with excess CEO compensation, implying that such directors serve an inadequate check on management. Busy directors have a higher propensity to be absent from board meetings neglecting their duties by not taking part in the strategic decisions-making processes (Jiraporn et al., 2008) . Beasly (1996) provides evidence that the number of board seats held by supervisory directors exhibits positive correlation with accounting fraud, and points to the lack of attention from these directors. Busy directors tend to take care of their own reputation and to leave underperforming companies, suggesting that the presence of overstretched directors may be endogenous to firm performance (Brown and Maloney, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006 governance and equity risk, focusing on the board of directors, and find a negative relationship between the market risk of equity and multiple directorships held by independent board members.
Information asymmetry 17 might be especially pronounced in the presence of busy boards, due to the inability of busy directors to provide thorough monitoring and to identify problems in a timely manner. Busy boards with overcommitted directors could result in severe agency problems, due to poor monitoring. This might result in CEO's and top executives' short-termism and might increase company's exposure to stock price crash risk.
A CEO with a busy board might be incentivized to camouflage real situation in the company in order to protect himself/herself from job loss and to secure private benefits, at least for a time. However, upon the release of negative firm-specific information, company faces a shock, which leads to the increase in its stock price crash risk. Considering the above arguments and results from previous research, we hypothesize that in the presence of busy boards, firms are more exposed to the stock price crash risk and propose the following (busyness) hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Busy boards are positively associated with stock price crash risk. higher CPS and busier boards might be exposed to higher stock price crash risk during asymmetry.
periods of market instability.
Considering the above arguments, we hypothesize that effect of CPS and board busyness on stock price crash risk might be stronger in the industries with low competition and especially pronounced when markets are turbulent.
Hypothesis 3a:
The impact of CPS and board busyness on stock price crash risk is stronger in industries with lower level of competition.
Hypothesis 3b: The effect of CPS and board busyness on stock price crash risk is more pronounced during the recession periods.
Sample Selection and Data Description
The Sample
We use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. We collect firms' financial and market information from the Thompson Datastream, whereas corporate governance and directors' compensation information is from the BoardEx database.
The sample period is from 1997 to 2010 and includes all firms whose information is available from these two sources.
The BoardEx database consists of directors' information, including name, role title and description, indication of whether director is executive or supervisory director, the number of years each director served on the board and in his/her current role, director's total, cash/direct and equity compensation, and the number of quoted companies' boards on which each director currently sits. From this database, we obtain data for non-financial firms for which there is information available for at least two executive board members and a company has a CEO.
We collect accounting and stock market data necessary to calculate risk measures and given year Tail Risk is defined as the negative of the average return on the company's stock over the 5% of its worst return weeks (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013) .
Our second measure is the Extreme Sigma. It is defined as a negative of the worst deviation of firm-specific weekly returns from the average firm-specific weekly returns divided by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns (see Andreou et al., 2013 ).
For a given firm i in a year t, the extreme sigma is computed as:
Where , is the firm-specific weekly return; ̅ , is the average firm-specific weekly return in the fiscal year, and , is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns.
The firm-specific weekly return for firm i in the week t defined as W i,t= ln(1+ε i,t ), where , represents the residuals from the expanded index model regression (8):
, = + 1, , −2 + 2, , −1 + 3, , + 4, , +1 + 5, , +2 + ,
Where r i, t is the return on stock i in the week t, and r m,t is the return on the FTSE Allshare index in the week t. We follow Andreou et al. (2013) and include lead and lag variables for the market index in a regression which separates market-wide return movements from firm returns, so that residuals capture weekly firm-specific returns.
The third measure is the Negative conditional skewness (NCSKEW) . Following Kim (2011a , 2011b , An and Zhang (2013) and Andreou (2013) we calculate NCSKEW by taking the negative of the third central moment of firm-specific deviations of weekly returns from the company's annual mean return, scaled by the sample variance of firm-specific weekly return raised to the power of 3/2. Specifically, we compute NCSKEW for the firm i in fiscal year t as:
where , is the firm-specific weekly return, ̅ , is the average firm-specific weekly return in the fiscal year, and n is the number of observations in the year t.
Scaling the raw third moment by cubed standard deviation is a standard normalization employed for skewness in statistics that allows for a comparison across returns with different variances. We follow the literature by putting a minus sign in front of the skewness so that an increase in NCSKEW corresponds to more crash risk, i.e., a more negatively-skewed stock return distribution.
Our definition of CPS is marginally different from that in Bebchuk et al. (2011) . We compute CPS as a fraction of the total compensation of a group of top executives (minimum two and maximum five), that is received by the CEO 20 . We follow Ferris et al. (2003) in our definition of busy boards, and consider directors busy if they have seats on boards of three or more listed companies. We control for other influences on crash risk, found to be important in the previous studies (see Andreou et al., 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013 among others),
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British corporate boards are, on average smaller than American boards. Only 16% of our sample companies have five or more executive directors at the board level. and include firm size, capital expenditures, and leverage in our models. We also collect information about each firm's governance structure, such as board size, board composition, CEO tenure, CEO duality, whether the CEO is insider or outsider (i.e. was/was not a firm employee before being appointed to the CEO position). Variable definitions are provided in We use a dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) 22 estimator in our analysis. The GMM estimator has the following advantages: (1) it allows to include firm fixed effects to account for the firm's unobserved heterogeneity; (2) it considers the impact of previous stock price crashes on the current state of corporate governance in a firm; (3) it accounts for simultaneity by using a combination of variables from a firm's history as valid instruments (Wintoki et al., 2012) .
We estimate the effect of governance characteristics on risk, conditional on firm heterogeneity, by using the following empirical model 23 :
Where vectors X, Z, and y are corporate governance, firm and risk characteristics, respectively; captures the effect of governance on firm's risk; η is an unobserved firm effect, and is a random error term.
The estimation procedure involves two important steps. First, we take the first differences of (1):
and eliminate all unobserved time invariant heterogeneity. We use GMM to estimate (2), and 22 The dynamic panel GMM estimator, which was developed in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) ; Arellano and Bond (1991); Arellano and Bover (1995); and Blundell and Bond (1998), improves on ordinary least squares estimates (OLS) and fixed effects estimates. 23 We follow Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Wintoki et al. (2012) in this approach.
use lagged values of stock price crash risk, corporate governance and firm-specific variables as instruments for these variables. There are two important criteria defining the validity of these instruments: first, they must provide a source of variation for current governance, i.e., = ( − , − , − ), where k>p, and X, Z, and y are corporate governance, firm, and risk characteristics, respectively. Second, lagged values must be exogenous in order to be valid instruments. For the exogeniety assumptions to be valid, we need the following orthogonality conditions to hold:
We can then estimate (2) using GMM and considering orthogonality conditions (3). However, there are econometric shortcomings associated with this procedure. First, "if [the] original model is conceptually in levels" (Wintoki, 2012: p.588 ), differencing will reduce the variation in the explanatory variables and consequently, the power of the tests (Beck et al..
2000)
. Second, variables in levels may be weak instruments for first-differenced equations (Arrelano and Bover, 1995) . Third, first differencing may worsen the impact of measurement errors on the dependent variables (Griliches and Hausman, 1986).
Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that it is possible to mitigate these shortcomings and improve the GMM estimator by including the equations in levels in the estimation procedure. It is then possible to use first-differenced variables as instruments for the equations in levels in a "stacked" system of equations that includes equations in both levels and differences, resulting in a system GMM estimator that involves estimating the following system:
To deal with unobserved heterogeneity in level equation, we make a reasonable assumption that correlation between governance/firm characteristics and unobserved effects (such as, for example managerial ability, managerial productivity, etc.) will be constant over time. This assumption requires additional orthogonality conditions:
We carry out GMM panel estimation considering the orthogonality conditions of (3) and (5), and assume no serial correlation in the error term, ϵ. The orthogonality conditions imply that we can use lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equations and lagged differences as instruments for the level equations, respectively.
To verify a key exogeniety assumption that the firm's historical risk and characteristics are exogenous with respect to current shocks or innovations in risk, we also test for the second-order serial correlation 24 and over-identification 25 , as suggested by
Arellano and Bond (1991).
As a potential concern with our analysis could be that the relationship between corporate governance and stock price crash risk is dynamically endogenous, i.e. that company's past stock price crash risk determines both current corporate governance arrangements and current risk (see Wintoki et al.(2012) and Ellul and Erramilli (2013) ). We follow Ellul and Erramilli (2013) , and address this concern by analyzing a relationship between corporate governance and stock price crash risk using a dynamic panel GMM estimator in the following form: 24 For the GMM estimates, if the assumptions of the specification are valid, by construction the residuals in first differences (AR(1)) should be correlated, but there should be no serial correlation in second differences (AR (2)). 25 Multiple lags are used as instruments in the dynamic panel GMM model. Hence, the system is over-identified and test of over-identification has to be carried out. The Hansen test provides a J-statistic, which is distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of the validity of instruments.
provided in Table 4 .1.
Results
In this section we discuss our empirical results concerning the association between corporate governance characteristics such as CPS and board busyness and Crash Risk, measured by three different proxies, i.e., Tail Risk, Negative Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma.
Our models include the standard controls used in the literature. Thus, we control for firm size (log of firm's market value), firm capital expenditures and leverage; we also control for the board size, board composition, CEO-Chairman duality, CEO tenure, whether the CEO is insider (i.e., was a company employee before being appointed CEO) or outsider, and year dummy. We run few tests to check for the potential misspecification of our estimation model.
First, we use the Hansen J statistics of overidentification restrictions to check for the validity of our chosen instruments and, second, we use m 2 statistics, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test for the lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, and find no such problem in our model.
The results are displayed in Table 4 .5, and provide consistent evidence that corporate governance mechanisms are significantly associated with stock price crashes. Specifically, we find that coefficients on CPS are positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level) in all our models, indicating that stock price crash risk is higher when CPS is high. High CPS magnifies the agency problem, and is a form of rent extraction by a dominant CEO. It might incentivize a CEO to prioritize short-term goals in order to secure his/her own private benefits and expropriate wealth from shareholders. In addition, a CEO can hide problems from the board for some time until bad news is "revealed by disaster" (Walkling, 2010: p.17 We also find firm Size (measured as natural logarithm of market value of equity) is negatively related to stock price crash risk with all coefficients being statistically significant at the 1% level. The reason for this negative relation might be that larger firms are more stable and less exposed to such a risk. Our analysis also reveals that leverage and capital expenditures positively affect crash risk. These results are in line with our expectations and are in agreement with findings from previous literature (see Kim et al., 2011a, An and Zhang, 2013 ). ***Insert Table 5 here***
Further tests
Effect of industry competition on the stock price crashes
In accordance with agency theory, effective corporate governance helps to alleviate managerial opportunism by reducing the information asymmetry that exists between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Effect of corporate governance on agency problem depends on industry competition (Giroud and Mueller, 2010) . When competition is high, 'bad' managers are penalized by the market and the importance of the monitoring element of corporate governance is reduced. We follow Andreou et al. (2013) and measure industry competition by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is calculated as the sum of squared market shares as follow:
Where S i,j,t is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t. Market share is calculated using firm sales. We estimate industry competition for each of the 15 FTAG3 industry classifications. High values of HHI values indicate weaker industry competition.
We split our sample in two groups, high and low competition, based on the value of HHI at year t-1 (HHI value lower than the median identifies the high competition group, and HHI value higher than the median identifies the low competition group). We re-estimate our baseline models from Table 4 .5 for the two subsamples separately to identify the impact of corporate governance on stock price crashes in the different regimes. The results are shown in Table 4 .6. The results are consistent with the results from the baseline models from Table 4 .5.
However, we find that the influence of corporate governance on stock price crashes is contracts. This is due to the extraction of private benefits by executives, which may be greater during recessions, when the expected rate of return on investment falls. We investigate the effect of corporate governance on stock price crashes during the recent financial crisis. We follow An and Zhang (2013) in identify years 2007 and 2008 as the crisis years. We use a dummy variable for the crisis years, and include it in our baseline model from Table 4 .5. We also check whether CPS and board busyness have more pronounced effects on the stock price crashes during these years by including the interaction variables, CPS x Crisis and Board_Busyness x Crisis. The results are represented in Table 4 .7.
When Tail Risk is used as a proxy for the stock price crash, the Crisis variable is positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level), indicating the increased stock price crash risk of firms during the financial crisis. Other variables of interest are the interaction variables CPS x Crisis and Board_Busyness x Crisis. The impact of CPS during the crisis becomes negative and statistically significant when Tail risk is used as a measure of stock price crash. A plausible explanation is that high CPS motivates CEO to perform better during turbulent periods, i.e., if CEO with high CPS can manage to reduce stock price crash risk during the crisis years, he/she continues to enjoy career benefits in form of high CPS.
However, Board_Busyness x Crisis is not significant at the conventional level, which suggests that the association between board busyness and stock price crash risk is not significantly different during the financial crisis. When Negative Conditional skewness is used as a proxy for stock price crash risk, the Crisis variable is also positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level) indicating that stock price crash during the financial crisis increases. The impact of CPS during the crisis becomes negative, but is not statistically significant, while Board_Busyness x Crisis is positive and significant (at the 1% level), suggesting that firms with busy boards were more exposed to stock price crash risk during the crisis years. When Extreme Sigma is used as a proxy for stock price crash risk, the impact of CPS during the crisis becomes negative but is not statistically significant. Board_Busyness x
Crisis is also positive and significant (at the 5% level), which suggests that firms with busy boards face higher stock price crash risks during the crisis years. Overall, the results from High CPS magnifies agency problems and might incentivize a CEO to take on decisions that enable to extract rents and expropriate shareholder wealth. A dominant CEO could prioritize short-term price maximization to secure his/her own private benefits and hide true information from the board of directors increasing company's exposure to stock price crash risks. In turn, busy boards with overcommitted directors could result in the severe agency problem; they (busy boards) might be unable to monitor management effectively.
Weak corporate boards encourage CEO's opportunistic behaviors and short-termism and company's exposure to stock price crash risks increase.
Our analysis reveals a positive association between CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk. Companies with high CPS and busy boards tend to be more exposed to stock price crash risks. The results of our study are robust when controlling for various firm, board and CEO characteristics, including board composition, board size, CEO/Chairman duality, CEO tenure and whether CEO was previously a company employee, as well as firm size, value of capital expenditures, and leverage; and to different regime specifications, including different levels of industry competition. Our findings are in line with findings in Andreou et al. (2013) , An and Zhang (2013) , and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) . However, this is the first study that we are aware of which investigates the governance -stock price crash risk relationship using the UK-based sample.
Motivated by the changes in remuneration practices introduced by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) and the "say on pay" law (2013), we find that CPS is an important aspect of firm governance and management, that deserves attention of both researches and policy makers. The fact that CPS positively impacts on stock price crash risk has a strong implication for the on-going debate about how to reform executive remuneration so that it provides the right incentives. Our findings highlight the importance of considering remuneration issues at the board, rather than just at the CEO level, and support The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) principles 26 . Even if a CEO compensation package is perfectly structured and implemented, it does not guarantee that it will lead to improvements in the firm riskiness, as it may provoke resistance of other board members. As corporate governance reforms move towards increasing boards' responsibilities for risk and performance, it is important to consider board-wide remuneration issues without narrowing them to the CEO's compensation.
There is also a direct implication for the public debate on limitation of the number of directorships held by executives from our findings. While the National Association of Corporate Directors (1996) put forward a threshold of three directorships, and the Council of Institutional Investors (2003) argues that directors with full-time jobs should not participate in more than two other boards in order to guarantee that they can give adequate service, we argue that board effectiveness depends also on its overall level of busyness, i.e. on the proportion of busy directors at the board level. 
Tail Risk
The negative of the average return on the company's stock over the 5% worst return weeks for the company's stock
Extreme Sigma
The negative of the worst deviation of firm-specific weekly returns from the average firm-specific weekly returns divided by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns
Negative conditional skewness
The negative conditional skewness. we calculate negative conditional skewness by taking the negative of the third central moment of firm-specific deviations of weekly returns from the company's annual mean return scaled by the sample variance of the same raised to the power of 3/2.
Corporate Governance
CEO pay slice (CPS)
The fraction of the total compensation to the group of minimum top-two and maximum top-five executives, including CEO that is received by the CEO.
Board busyness
The proportion of busy directors at the board level. Busy directors are defined as directors holding three or more directorships, including the "home" company, in the public companies at the same time.
Board composition
The proportion of executive directors on the board. Total number of supervisory directors divided by the total number of all directors on the board.
Board size
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